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COMMENT
TEARING DOWN A HOUSE OF COUPONS:




In Ramsey v. Nestle Waters North America, Inc., plaintiffs filed a class
action lawsuit against Poland Springs, alleging the company’s bottled water
did not actually “come from a spring deep in the woods of Maine” as adver-
tised.1 The parties quickly agreed to a settlement that provided class mem-
bers discounts on Poland Springs’ water and $2.75 million to charities.2
While class members received coupons for the very water that allegedly
caused them harm, class counsel received $1.35 million in attorneys’ fees.3
This settlement illustrates the main problem with coupon settlements: class
members receive coupons of little value while their attorneys collect enor-
mous fees.
Coupon settlements are agreements to dismiss a lawsuit in exchange
for discounts on the defendant’s products or services.4 Coupon settlements
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1. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 17 (2005).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Laurens Walker, The Consumer Class Action Bill of Rights: A Policy and Political Mis-
take, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 849, 859 (2007); Geoffrey P. Miller & Lori S. Singer, Nonpecuniary Class
Action Settlements, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1997, at 102, 108 (“A coupon settlement is
a settlement where the defendant creates a right for class members to obtain a discount on future
purchases of the defendant’s products or services. The right to receive a discount is the considera-
tion class members receive instead of an immediate cash payment. The defendant receives a re-
lease from legal claims and the benefit of the consumers’ increased incentives to purchase one of
906
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are not inherently flawed5 and can be an effective way to resolve consumer
class action lawsuits.6 But, they have been frequently abused and manipu-
lated, causing widespread criticism and prompting Congress to address the
issue in the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA).7 CAFA proposes to
(1) assure fair and prompt recoveries for class members with le-
gitimate claims; (2) restore the intent of the framers of the United
States Constitution by providing for Federal court consideration
of interstate cases of national importance under diversity jurisdic-
tion; and (3) benefit society by encouraging innovation and low-
ering consumer prices.8
To accomplish these goals, CAFA regulates federal class action law-
suits in three significant ways:9 First, CAFA extended diversity jurisdiction
to permit more class action lawsuits to be heard in federal court.10 Second,
the Act eased the requirements to remove class actions to federal court.11
Third, CAFA enacted the Consumer Class Action Bill of Rights.12
The Consumer Class Action Bill of Rights regulates settlements that
provide little benefit to class members while their attorneys receive large
fees.13 To address this problem, CAFA limits attorneys’ fees in coupon set-
tlements, requires court approval of coupon settlements, and compels de-
fendants to notify public officials of proposed settlements.14
Despite widespread criticism, coupon settlements can provide real
value to class members when used appropriately and can be effective tools
to remedy consumer class action claims. This Comment argues that while
CAFA has effectively addressed the abuses of coupon settlements, it may
prevent coupon settlements in situations where they could provide real
value to class members. Part I of the Comment discusses the historic abuses
and benefits of coupon settlements. Part II explains how CAFA responded
to the coupon settlement manipulations. Part III examines how courts have
its products or services.”). Coupon settlements also may include in-kind settlements that provide
customers free products or services. See infra Part III.A.
5. James Tharin & Brian Blockovich, Coupons and the Class Action Fairness Act, 18 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 1443,1444–45 (2005).
6. Id.
7. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 5.
8. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(b), 119 Stat. 4 (2005).
9. Allan Kanner & M. Ryan Casey, Consumer Class Actions After CAFA, 56 DRAKE L.
REV. 303, 305 (2008).
10. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2012); Kanner & Casey, supra note 9, at 305; Steven M. Puis-
zis, Developing Trends with the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 115,
121–22 (2006).
11. See 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c); Kanner & Casey, supra note 9, at 305; Puiszis, supra note 10,
at 148–49.
12. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1711–15 (2006); Kanner & Casey, supra note 9, at 305. This Comment
will not discuss the jurisdictional provisions of CAFA. Rather, it will focus on the provisions of
the Consumer Class Action Bill of Rights.
13. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 5 (2005).
14. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1712, 1715.
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interpreted CAFA’s provisions, specifically advocating that courts adopt a
broad definition of coupon settlements and discussing the level of scrutiny
courts have applied when reviewing coupon settlements. Finally, Part IV
analyzes CAFA’s effect on coupon settlements.
I. A BACKGROUND ON COUPON SETTLEMENTS
Coupon settlements are not fundamentally unfair. Rather, if structured
correctly, coupon settlements can be an effective tool to resolve class action
lawsuits.15 Nevertheless, throughout their history, coupon settlements have
been manipulated to give lawyers massive fees and class members little
benefit.16
A. The Problems of Coupon Settlements
Coupon settlements have been criticized because they often (1) fail to
provide meaningful compensation to class members, (2) do not deter de-
fendants, (3) force class members to do business with defendants,17 and (4)
promote collusion between class counsel and defendants.
1. Failure to Meaningfully Compensate Class Members
Coupon settlements can be manipulated to deny meaningful compen-
sation to class members.18 The value of a coupon settlement to class mem-
bers is not the face value of the coupons issued but rather the value of the
coupons actually redeemed.19 If class members do not use the coupons, they
receive no value from the settlement.20 Although figures vary, some studies
show class members redeem 26.3% of coupons issued in settlements.21 Re-
demption rates, however, are often far smaller.22 For example, in In re
Cuisinart Food Processor Litigation, class members redeemed only 0.54%
of the coupons.23 In Perish v. Intel Corp., class members used only 150 of
15. Tharin & Blockovich, supra note 5, at 1444–45.
16. Steven B. Hantler & Robert E. Norton, Coupon Settlements: The Emperor’s Clothes of
Class Actions, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1343, 1344 (2005).
17. Christopher R. Leslie, The Need to Study Coupon Settlements in Class Action Litigation,
18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1395, 1397 (2005) [hereinafter Leslie, The Need to Study].
18. Tharin & Blockovich, supra note 5, at 1445. But see Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman,
Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth: The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers,
155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 105, 152 (2006) (advocating that critics should evaluate class action
settlements based on their deterrent effect, not how well they compensate class members).
19. See Hantler & Norton, supra note 16, at 1347.
20. See id.
21. See Christopher R. Leslie, A Market-Based Approach to Coupon Settlements in Antitrust
and Consumer Class Action Litigation, 49 UCLA L. REV. 991, 1035 (2002) [hereinafter Leslie, A
Market-Based Approach].
22. See Tharin & Blockovich, supra note 5, at 1445 (suggesting that redemption rates may be
as low as one to three percent); Hantler & Norton, supra note 16, at 1347 (describing a case
involving ITT Financial Corporation where only 2 of the 96,754 coupons issued were redeemed).
23. Tharin & Blockovich, supra note 5, at 1447.
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the 500,000 coupons distributed for a fifty-dollar discount on
microprocessors.24
Defendants keep redemption rates low by incorporating restrictions
into coupon settlements.25 A common restriction limits class members’
ability to transfer coupons.26 If class members cannot transfer coupons, they
cannot sell their coupons to secondary markets for cash.27 As a result, if
class members do not want to use the coupon, it is wasted, and the class
members receive no value.28
Defendants restrict the transferability of coupons with express transfer
limitations and short expiration dates.29 Express transfer restrictions may
prohibit or limit the transferability of the coupon30 while expiration dates
make coupons less attractive to secondary purchasers because they reduce
secondary markets’ ability to use coupons.31 As a result, restrictions on
transferability often limit, if not completely eliminate, class members’ abil-
ity to sell the coupon to secondary markets.32
Restrictions on aggregation, products, and redemption also reduce the
value of coupons.33 Restrictions on aggregation prevent class members
from using coupons with other deals, controlling the amount of the dis-
count.34 Product restrictions limit the products to which the coupons apply
(often inferior or very expensive goods), making the coupon less attractive
to class members.35 Redemption restrictions make coupons difficult to
24. Id. at 1448.
25. Leslie, A Market-Based Approach, supra note 21, at 1005; Hantler & Norton, supra note
16, at 1346–47.
26. Leslie, A Market-Based Approach, supra note 21, at 1015; J. Brendan Day, Comment,
My Lawyer Went to Court and All I Got Was This Lousy Coupon! The Class Action Fairness Act’s
Inadequate Provision for Judicial Scrutiny Over Proposed Coupon Settlements, 38 SETON HALL
L. REV. 1085, 1100 (2008).
27. Leslie, A Market-Based Approach, supra note 21, at 1018.
28. Id.
29. Leslie, The Need to Study, supra note 17, at 1403; see Severin Borenstein, Settling for
Coupons: Discount Contracts as Compensation and Punishment in Antitrust Lawsuits, 39 J.L. &
ECON. 379, 381 (1996) (describing the value reducing effect of short expiration dates).
30. Leslie, A Market-Based Approach, supra note 21, at 1017; see Tharin & Blockovich,
supra note 5, at 1447.
31. Leslie, A Market-Based Approach, supra note 21, at 1072 (describing that restrictions
such as expiration dates reduce value to secondary markets); Borenstein, supra note 29, at
381–82. Even without restrictions on transferability, selling coupons to a secondary market may
be costly and inefficient. Miller & Singer, supra note 4, at 108.
32. Leslie, A Market-Based Approach, supra note 21, at 1015–17; see Day, supra note 26, at
1100.
33. Leslie, A Market-Based Approach, supra note 21, at 1018, 1021–22, 1024; see also
Tharin & Blockovich, supra note 5, at 1447 (describing most coupons as “burdensome, restrictive
and confusing”).
34. Leslie, A Market-Based Approach, supra note 21, at 1020–21; see Day, supra note 26, at
1100.
35. Leslie, A Market-Based Approach, supra note 21, at 1024, 1027–28; see Day, supra note
26, at 1100.
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use.36 For example, defendants often require class members to fill out paper
work or present receipts to redeem the coupons.37 As a result, many class
members do not bother to go through the process to obtain the coupons.38 In
effect, these restrictions all work to lower redemption rates and reduce the
value of the coupons.39
The coupon settlement in In re Domestic Air Transportation Antitrust
Litigation illustrates the effects of these restrictions. In the action, the court
approved a combined settlement for $50 million in cash and $408 million in
travel certificates, which provided discounts on airline tickets.40 The certifi-
cates, however, had many restrictions. Class members could only transfer
the certificates once,41 eliminating the ability to sell the certificates to a
secondary market.42 Class members could also not use the travel certificates
in conjunction with other promotions.43 Finally, the certificates were not
valid during peak travel times, such as Thanksgiving, Christmas, and New
Year’s.44 As a result, the coupons were not attractive to class members, and
less than ten percent of the certificates were redeemed.45
2. Failure to Deter Defendants
Coupon settlements, moreover, often fail to deter misconduct because
they do not punish or “disgorge ill-gotten gains from the defendant.”46 Con-
versely, due to low redemption rates, defendants are largely not affected by
coupon settlements.47
Even if class members redeem coupons, they promote defendants’
products and increase sales.48 Essentially, the settlements induce class
members to buy products they would not have bought without the coupon,
increasing sales.49 For example, CAFA’s legislative history cites a case
where plaintiffs accused a cruise line of collecting excessive dock
36. Leslie, A Market-Based Approach, supra note 21, at 1023; Day, supra note 26, at 1100.
37. Leslie, A Market-Based Approach, supra note 21, at 1023.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1035; Day, supra note 26, at 1100.
40. In re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust Litig., 148 F.R.D. 297, 305, 308 (N.D. Ga. 1993).
41. Id. at 309.
42. Leslie, A Market-Based Approach, supra note 21, at 1017.
43. In re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust Litig., 148 F.R.D. at 331.
44. Id. at 331 n.40; Leslie, A Market-Based Approach, supra note 21, at 1025.
45. Tharin & Blockovich, supra note 5, at 1446; see Day, supra note 26, at 1100.
46. Leslie, The Need to Study, supra note 17, at 1398; Day, supra note 26, at 1086–87.
47. Leslie, A Market-Based Approach, supra note 21, at 1007.
48. Leslie, The Need to Study, supra note 17, at 1397. Defendants often structure settlement
coupons like any other promotional campaign that uses coupons to promote their products. Leslie,
A Market-Based Approach, supra note 21, at 1006–07; David R. Koch, Clipping Coupons, OR-
ANGE COUNTY L., July 2005, at 46, 46. See also In re Mex. Money Transfer Litig., 267 F.3d 743,
748 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[C]oupons serve as a form of advertising for the defendants.”).
49. Leslie, A Market-Based Approach, supra note 21, at 1006, 1012.
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charges.50 Before the case settled, the defendant went out of business.51
Nevertheless, the parties structured the settlement so class members could
receive discounts on cruises from another independent company.52 Al-
though the independent company issuing the coupons faced no liability,
they agreed to provide the discounts because they viewed it as a promo-
tional scheme, not a punishment.53
Defendants can also structure coupons to ensure they make a marginal
profit on each sale. Defendants do this by either raising prices following
settlements to negate the coupon’s effect54 or controlling the amount of the
discount. Furthermore, defendants only lose money on coupon settlements
when class members use coupons to buy products that they would have
bought without the coupon.55 In this situation, defendants lose money be-
cause they would have sold the product to the class member at full price
without the coupon. Therefore, the coupon saves the class member money
and reduces the defendant’s profits.56 Conversely, if a coupon attracts a new
customer to purchase the product, the company benefits because the cus-
tomer would not have purchased it without the coupon, increasing the de-
fendant’s sales. Nevertheless, as discussed above, both situations result in a
marginal profit for the defendant.57
3. Forcing Class Members to Do Business with Defendants
Coupon settlements are typically only available for defendants’ prod-
ucts.58 Therefore, to benefit from the settlements, class members must be
willing to do business with defendants.59 But, many class members refuse
to do business with defendants who have just engaged in misconduct. For
example, in a suit against General Mills, class members sued the company
because the oats used to make Cheerios allegedly came into contact with
improper pesticides.60 In response, the parties settled, and class members
received a coupon for more Cheerios.61 Therefore, to obtain relief, class
members not only needed to do business with the company that allegedly
harmed them, but they also had to buy the allegedly contaminated product.




54. In re Mex. Money Transfer Litig., 267 F.3d 743, 748 (7th Cir. 2001); see Borenstein,
supra note 29, at 381–82.
55. Leslie, A Market-Based Approach, supra note 21, at 1007.
56. Id. at 1008.
57. Id.; Borenstein, supra note 29, at 381. For a discussion on the economics of coupon
settlements, see id. at 381–99.
58. Leslie, A Market-Based Approach, supra note 21, at 1028; Koch, supra note 48, at 46.
59. Walker, supra note 4, at 860.
60. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 20 (2005); Day, supra note 26, at 1104.
61. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 20; Day, supra note 26, at 1104.
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Class members also feel they should not have to spend money to bene-
fit from a settlement.62 This is especially problematic when the coupon is
only valid for expensive products.63 In such situations, class members may
not want to spend the money to use the coupon and are essentially excluded
from relief.64 For example, in In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck
Fuel Tank Products Liability Litigation, defendants offered class members
coupons for a one thousand dollar discount on a General Motors or Chevro-
let truck.65 Here, the benefit would only be available to class members who
were willing to buy another truck; and, consequently, the court rejected the
settlement.66
4. Class Counsel’s and Class Members’ Interests Conflict
a. Coupon Settlements Present Opportunities for Collusion
Class counsel are considered the “guardians of the class”67 and have a
duty to protect class members from settlements that provide little or no
value. Nevertheless, coupon settlements present opportunities for class
counsel to advance their own interests at the expense of class members.68 In
such situations, class counsel may structure coupon settlements so they re-
ceive large fees while class members receive little value.69
In most class action lawsuits, class counsel and class members’ inter-
ests are aligned. Class counsel often receive a percentage of the total class
recovery. Therefore, it is in both class counsel and class members’ best
interest to obtain the largest possible settlement.70 But, coupon settlements
separate the interests of class counsel and class members.71 Prior to CAFA,
class counsel’s attorneys’ fees in coupon settlements were based on the total
value of the coupons offered to class members, not the value of the coupons
62. Leslie, A Market-Based Approach, supra note 21, at 1029.
63. Hantler & Norton, supra note 16, at 1348.
64. Leslie, A Market-Based Approach, supra note 21, at 1029.
65. In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 780
(3d. Cir. 1995); see also Brian Wolfman & Alan B. Morrison, Representing the Unrepresented in
Class Actions Seeking Monetary Relief, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 439, 472–77 (1996) (describing the
problems of the proposed settlement).
66. In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d at 808;
Alexandra Lahav, Fundamental Principles for Class Action Governance, 37 IND. L. REV. 65,
88–89 (2003).
67. Leslie, The Need to Study, supra note 17, at 1398.
68. Id.; see Miller & Singer, supra note 4, at 98; Lisa M. Mezzetti & Whitney R. Case, The
Coupon Can Be the Ticket: The Use of “Coupon” and Other Non-Monetary Redress in Class
Action Settlements, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1431, 1439 (2005).
69. Christopher R. Leslie, De Facto Detrebling: The Rush to Settlement in Antitrust Class
Action Litigation, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 1009, 1016 (2008); Howard M. Erichson, CAFA’s Impact on
Class Action Lawyers, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1593, 1598–99 (2008).
70. Leslie, The Need to Study, supra note 17, at 1398.
71. Id.; see also Tharin & Blockovich, supra note 5, at 1447–48 (describing settlements
where class counsel’s and class members’ interests conflicted).
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redeemed by the class.72 Therefore, class counsel had no incentive to ensure
that class members actually redeemed or received value from the coupons.73
As long as the face value of the coupons offered was high, class counsel
would receive large fees.74 Defendants also readily paid high attorneys’ fees
so class counsel would agree to a settlement consisting of low-valued cou-
pons.75 Consequently, many argue that class counsel and defendants collude
to inflate the face value of coupons while imposing restrictions on the cou-
pons that undercut the actual value of the settlements.76
For example, in In re Domestic Air Transportation Antitrust Litigation,
both parties argued that the actual value of the travel certificates was $408
million (the face value of the discounts offered)77 and that redemption rates
would be fifty to seventy-five percent.78 Nevertheless, as discussed above,
the settlement included burdensome restrictions on transferability, aggrega-
tion, and products, which greatly reduced the value of the coupons.79 De-
spite class counsel and defendants’ assurances that the settlement provided
actual value to class members, less than ten percent of the coupons were
redeemed.80 Class counsel, however, received over $14 million in attor-
neys’ fees.81
Although the court did not find evidence of collusion, class counsel
and defendants grossly inflated the value of the coupons.82 Class counsel
and defendants exaggerated the value and the expected redemption rates
despite the numerous restrictions that negated the value of the coupons.
Critics argue that the settlement was “primarily ‘a promotional scheme to
induce travelers to fly’ during off-peak travel periods and ‘a deal’ worked
out so class counsel could reap their fees, calculated at between $500 and
$1,400 an hour.”83 Even if there was no explicit collusion between the par-
ties, at the very least, class counsel’s interests were not aligned with the
interests of class members.
72. Leslie, The Need to Study, supra note 17, at 1398.
73. Id.; see Tharin & Blockovich, supra note 5, at 1445 (explaining that attorneys often
unrealistically inflate estimated redemption rates and ignore contrary evidence).
74. Leslie, The Need to Study, supra note 17, at 1398; Day, supra note 26, at 1099.
75. Leslie, The Need to Study, supra note 17, at 1398.
76. Id.; Hantler & Norton, supra note 16, at 1344 (stating that class counsel and defendants
could work together to “inflate[ ] the apparent value of the coupons by overstating the number of
anticipated class members so that the cumulative value of the settlement would be artificially high
when it was used as the basis for plaintiffs’ lawyers’ fees”).
77. In re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust Litig., 148 F.R.D. 297, 320 (N.D. Ga. 1993). De-
fendants asserted that the value of the settlement was the face value of the coupons, and class
counsel argued that the “certificates have a ‘near cash’ value.” Id.
78. Id. at 323.
79. Id. at 309, 331 n.40; see Leslie, A Market-Based Approach, supra note 21, at 1017, 1025.
80. Tharin & Blockovich, supra note 5, at 1445–46.
81. In re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust Litig., 148 F.R.D. at 306.
82. See Hantler & Norton, supra note 16, at 1344–45.
83. Id. at 1345.
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b. A Lack of Accountability in Lawyer Driven Litigation
Furthermore, because coupon settlements and class actions are essen-
tially “clientless law,”84 class counsel’s interest often goes unchecked.
Class counsel typically initiate litigation in coupon settlements, not their
clients.85 Class counsel look for minor corporate misconduct and then will
find someone to represent the class (often a friend or colleague).86 Conse-
quently, class counsel are in complete control of the lawsuit, not their cli-
ents.87 This lack of accountability to clients promotes the separation of class
counsel and clients’ interests.88 As “the client becomes only a distant by-
stander,” class counsel’s own interest may supersede the interests of the
class.89 Consequently, class counsel could receive fees while class members
receive coupons of little value.
B. Potential Benefits of Coupon Settlements
Despite their history of abuse and manipulation, coupon settlements
can serve as a valuable tool to settle consumer class action lawsuits, provide
plaintiffs meaningful relief, and deter defendants from future misconduct.90
Coupon settlements effectively compensate class members when (1) the
face value of the coupons exceeds the class’s claim and (2) class members
either use or sell the coupons.91 Because coupon settlements are not overly
burdensome on defendants, coupon settlements allow defendants to provide
coupons to plaintiffs with a face value over the cash amount of their
claims.92 When the alleged damages are minimal, defendants can provide
coupons that provide larger discounts than the few dollars that class mem-




87. Leslie, A Market-Based Approach, supra note 21, at 1041.
88. John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer
as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 232 (1983) (“The possibility of collusive
settlements grows in direct proportion to the attorney’s ‘independence’ from his client. The naked
self interest of the bounty hunter lies in his fee, not the recovery to the class.”).
89. See id.
90. Miller & Singer, supra note 4, at 130–31; see also Borenstein, supra note 29, at 402
(advocating that coupon settlements should not have an expiration date, a limit on aggregation,
and should not be pooled across multiple defendants); Tharin & Blockovich, supra note 5, at 1445
(“If structured correctly, coupon settlements can work.”).
91. Hantler & Norton, supra note 16, at 1344.
92. See Miller & Singer, supra note 4, at 114–15 (providing examples of how coupon settle-
ments potentially benefit all parties of the settlement); Borenstein, supra note 29, at 403; Mezzetti
& Case, supra note 68, at 1433; William D. Henderson, Clear Sailing Agreements: A Special
Form of Collusion in Class Action Settlements, 77 TUL. L. REV. 813, 832 (2003) (noting that
defendants may also offer larger awards in coupons to retain the business of the plaintiff custom-
ers). For a discussion on why coupon settlements are less burdensome on defendants, see infra
Part I.A.2.
93. Day, supra note 26, at 1122; Mezzetti & Case, supra note 68, at 1433; Henderson, supra
note 92, at 832.
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Alternatively, if coupons are transferable, class members can sell the
coupons on a secondary market.94 Specifically, class members would sell
the coupons to market makers who then resell the coupons to the secondary
market.95 As a result, class members can resell their coupons for value and
still benefit from coupons even if they choose not to redeem them.
Furthermore, coupon settlements are effective when defendants are
facing bankruptcy.96 If a defendant is experiencing financial hardships, an
expensive settlement could force the defendant into bankruptcy.97 Since
class members are non-preferential creditors, they likely will receive little
to no compensation if defendants file bankruptcy before satisfying the set-
tlement.98 Coupon settlements, however, may allow defendants to avoid
bankruptcy because coupons impose lighter financial burdens on defendants
than cash settlements.99 Accordingly, class members will receive some
value for their claims “rather than a place in line at bankruptcy court.”100
Even though coupon settlements are less burdensome on defendants,
coupon settlements still deter misconduct.101 When participating in a cou-
pon settlement, defendants must “internalize the costs of harm” to the
class102 and pay damages in the form of lost profits. Even if redemption
rates are low, defendants must pay the attorneys’ fees and the administra-
tive costs required to carry out the settlement.103 Lost profits and the threat
of expensive, prolonged litigation act to deter future misconduct.
Coupon settlements are also an effective means to resolve weaker class
action claims.104 Litigating even weak class action lawsuits is extremely
expensive.105 Therefore, defendants have an incentive to settle as quickly
(and as cheaply) as possible.106 Because coupon settlements are less bur-
densome on defendants, they are an attractive option to dispose of weaker
claims without incurring high litigation costs.107 Although class members
94. See Leslie, A Market-Based Approach, supra note 21, at 1007.
95. Id. at 1017; Tharin & Blockovich, supra note 5, at 1443. A market maker is a company
that creates a secondary market for coupons, buys the coupons from class members, and then
resells the coupons to the secondary market. Id.
96. Day, supra note 26, at 1099; Mezzetti & Case, supra note 68, at 1433–34.
97. Edward F. Sherman, Class Actions After the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 80 TUL.
L. REV. 1593, 1614 (2006).
98. Miller & Singer, supra note 4, at 117.
99. See Sherman, supra note 97, at 1614.
100. Mezzetti & Case, supra note 68, at 1434.
101. Miller & Singer, supra note 4, at 113.
102. Id.
103. Leslie, A Market-Based Approach, supra note 21, at 1038 n.240.
104. Jennifer Gibson, New Rules for Class Action Settlements: The Consumer Class Action
Bill of Rights, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1103, 1121 (2006).
105. See id.
106. See Charles B. Casper, The Class Action Fairness Act’s Impact on Settlements, ANTI-
TRUST, Fall 2005, at 26, 26 (describing the pressure on defendants to settle even weak class action
lawsuits).
107. See Gibson, supra note 104, at 1109.
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do not receive considerable compensation, they get at least some relief for
their marginal claims.
To ensure that coupon settlements are beneficial, class counsel, de-
fendants, and the judiciary must work together to construct a settlement that
provides real value to class members. Not only must coupons be for prod-
ucts that class members are willing to buy, they should not be limited with
burdensome restrictions or redemption provisions. Furthermore, parties
should consider the nature of the claim and the financial status of defendant.
If parties create a settlement that focuses on the interest of class members,
coupons could be an effective tool to settle the claim and compensate class
members.
II. THE RESPONSE TO COUPON SETTLEMENTS ABUSES
A. Congressional Concern over Coupon Settlements
Despite the potential benefits of coupon settlements, their abuses
sparked criticism from Congress.108 Notwithstanding the numerous criti-
ques of coupon settlements discussed above, Congress focused on settle-
ments where class counsel’s fees were disproportionate to the class’s
recovery.109 Specifically, CAFA’s legislative history criticized cases where
class counsel received large fees while class members received only “pro-
motional coupons to purchase more products.”110
For example, the legislative history noted that the attorneys’ fees in In
re Kansas Microsoft Litigation were disproportionate to class members’ re-
covery.111 In this case, class members sued Microsoft for price fixing, and
the settlement provided coupons for a five to ten dollar discount on
Microsoft products.112 Due to product restrictions and complex redemption
requirements, only a small number of class members actually redeemed the
coupons.113 But, class counsel requested hundreds of millions of dollars in
fees.114
Although In re Kansas Microsoft Litigation involves actual coupons, it
is important to note that CAFA’s legislative history cites abuses in various
types of in-kind settlements, not just coupon settlements.115 For example,
the legislative history cites cases where class members received free prod-
ucts without a coupon.116 Furthermore, in Shields v. Bridgestone/Firestone,
108. See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 15–21 (2005).
109. Id. at 14–15.
110. Id. at 15.
111. Id. at 16.
112. Id.
113. Day, supra note 26, at 1102.
114. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 16. The actual attorneys’ fees received were never reported. Day,
supra note 26, at 1102.
115. See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 11–16.
116. Id. at 17–18.
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class members received injunctive relief.117 This is important when examin-
ing the scope of CAFA; by including various types of in-kind settlements,
the legislative history suggests that CAFA attempts to protect against a
broad range of in-kind settlement abuses.
B. Consumer Class Action Bill of Rights
To address the abuses of coupon settlements, Congress passed the
Consumer Class Action Bill of Rights as part of CAFA.118 The Consumer
Class Action Bill of Rights specifically restricts coupon settlements in four
major ways:119 First, the Act regulates attorneys’ fees in coupon settle-
ments.120 Second, CAFA requires courts to approve coupon settlements.121
Third, courts have the discretion to distribute unredeemed coupons to chari-
table and governmental organizations.122 Fourth, defendants must notify ap-
propriate public officials of proposed settlements.123
C. Attorneys’ Fees Under CAFA
CAFA primarily addresses the abuses of coupon settlements by regu-
lating attorneys’ fees in coupon settlements.124 When a settlement provides
class members with coupons, class counsels’ fee award attributed to the
coupons must be based on the value of the coupons that are actually re-
deemed.125 As a result, CAFA changes prior practice where courts calcu-
lated attorneys’ fees based on the value of the coupons offered to, not
redeemed by, the class.126 CAFA further allows experts to testify on the
actual value of the coupons redeemed.127 Under CAFA, if a settlement
agreement issues $1 million in coupons to class members, but only one-
fourth of the coupons are redeemed, class counsel’s fee will be based on a
recovery of $250,000, not $1 million.128
CAFA section 1712(a), consequently, realigns class counsel’s interest
with class members’ interests.129 When coupon settlements are valuable to
117. Id. at 15–16.
118. Day, supra note 26, at 1105–06.
119. Walker, supra note 4, at 859.
120. 28 U.S.C. § 1712(a) (2006).
121. Id. § 1712(e).
122. Id.
123. 28 U.S.C. § 1715(b) (2006).
124. Day, supra note 26, at 1109.
125. 28 U.S.C. § 1712(a) (“If a proposed settlement in a class action provides for a recovery
of coupons to a class member, the portion of any attorney’s fee award to class counsel that is
attributable to the award of the coupons shall be based on the value to class members of the
coupons that are redeemed.”).
126. Day, supra note 26, at 1099.
127. 28 U.S.C. § 1712(d). Prior to CAFA, however, courts also routinely allowed experts to
testify to the value of coupon settlements. Puiszis, supra note 10, at 174.
128. See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 31 (2005). See also Day, supra note 26, at 1109–10.
129. Tharin & Blockovich, supra note 5, at 1449.
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class members, class members will redeem more coupons, and class coun-
sel will receive larger fees. Therefore, class counsel now have an incentive
to eliminate restrictions that undercut the value of coupons and reduce re-
demption rates.130
CAFA, however, does not require class counsel to calculate their fees
based on a percentage of the coupons that are actually redeemed.131 Rather,
class counsel alternatively may calculate their fees “based upon the amount
of time class counsel reasonably expended working in the action.”132 In
other words, class counsel may use the lodestar133 method with a multiplier
to calculate their fees.134 CAFA, nevertheless, requires the court to approve
attorneys’ fees regardless of whether they are based on the percentage re-
covery or lodestar method.135
D. Judicial Review of Coupon Settlements
CAFA further requires that courts approve coupon settlements in writ-
ing.136 CAFA requires that, after a hearing, courts must determine that the
proposed settlement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate for class mem-
bers.”137 Nevertheless, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e), courts
were already required to conclude that all class action settlements were fair,
reasonable, and adequate.138
The statute does not explain how § 1712(e) differs from Rule 23(e) or
whether it provides a different standard for approving coupon settle-
ments.139 CAFA’s legislative history, nevertheless, suggests that courts
“should consider, among other things, the real monetary value and likely
utilization rate of the coupons provided by the settlement.”140 Courts and
commentators disagree on § 1712’s standard for settlement approval and
whether it differs from Rule 23(e)(2).141
130. Puiszis, supra note 10, at 175.
131. 28 U.S.C. § 1712(b)–(c).
132. Id. § 1712(b)(1).
133. Under the lodestar method, the court awards fees based on a reasonable hourly rate multi-
plied by the number of hours worked and an appropriate multiplier. Robert H. Klonoff & Mark
Herrmann, The Class Action Fairness Act: An Ill-Conceived Approach to Class Settlements, 80
TUL. L. REV. 1695, 1703 (2006).
134. 28 U.S.C. § 1712(b)(2) (“Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to prohibit appli-
cation of a lodestar with a multiplier method of determining attorney’s fees.”).
135. Id.
136. Id. § 1712(e).
137. Id.
138. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2) (“If the proposal would bind class members, the court may
approve it only after a hearing and on finding that it is fair, reasonable, and adequate.”).
139. Kanner & Casey, supra note 9, at 306.
140. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 31 (2005).
141. Kanner & Casey, supra note 9, at 306. See infra Part III.B.
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E. Treatment of Unredeemed Coupons
Courts may additionally require parties to distribute the value of unre-
deemed coupons to one or more charitable or governmental organiza-
tions.142 Distributing unredeemed coupons to charities ensures that coupons
will not go unused and will have a greater deterrent effect on defendants.143
Class counsel, however, may not calculate their fees based on the proceeds
from these charitable distributions.144
F. Notification of Public Officials
Defendants must also notify public officials of proposed settlements
under CAFA. The Act requires that, within ten days of filing the proposed
settlement, each defendant participating in the settlement serve a notice of
proposed settlement to the “appropriate” Federal and State official of each
state in which a class member resides.145 The appropriate Federal official is
usually the U.S. Attorney General.146 If the defendant, however, is a federal
or state depository institution, the person with the primary regulatory or
supervisory responsibility over the defendant is the appropriate Federal offi-
cial.147 The appropriate State official is the person with “the primary regula-
tory supervisory responsibility with respect to the defendant, or who
licenses or otherwise authorizes the defendant to conduct business in the
State.”148 If there is no such official, the state attorney general is the appro-
priate public official.149
142. 28 U.S.C. § 1712(e) (“The court, in its discretion, may also require that a proposed settle-
ment agreement provide for the distribution of a portion of the value of unclaimed coupons to 1 or
more charitable or governmental organizations, as agreed to by the parties.”). Courts, however,
already could designate unclaimed coupons to charities under the cy pres doctrine. Klonoff &
Herrmann, supra note 133, at 1704. The cy pres doctrine, meaning “as near as,” allows the court
to modify an award for a purpose that is closely related to the objectives of the underlying lawsuit.
Id. at 1718.
143. Klonoff & Herrmann, supra note 133, at 1704–05.
144. 28 U.S.C. § 1712(e); see Klonoff & Herrmann, supra note 133, at 1704.
145. 28 U.S.C. § 1715(b) (2006) (“Not later than 10 days after a proposed settlement of a class
action is filed in court, each defendant that is participating in the proposed settlement shall serve
upon the appropriate State official of each State in which a class member resides and the appropri-
ate Federal official, a notice of the proposed settlement.”). Notice of the proposed settlement
consists of (1) “a copy of the complaint;” (2) “notice of any scheduled judicial hearing in the class
action;” (3) any notifications to the class members of their “rights to request exclusion from the
class action” or “a statement that no such right exists” and “any proposed settlement of a class
action;” (4) “any proposed or final class action settlement;” (5) “any settlement or other agree-
ment” made between the class counsel and defendants; (6) “any final judgment or notice of dis-
missal;” (7) “the names of class members who reside in each state and the estimated proportionate
share of the claims of such members to the entire settlement to that State’s appropriate State
official” but if it is not feasible then a reasonable estimate of such information; (8) “any written
judicial opinion relating to the materials described under subparagraphs (3) through (6).” Id.
146. Id. § 1715(a)(1)(A).
147. Id. § 1715(a)(1)(B).
148. Id. § 1715(a)(2).
149. Id.
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Additionally, the court must wait at least ninety days after notice is
provided to approve or reject the proposed settlement.150 If defendants fail
to provide notification, class members may choose not to be bound by the
settlement.151
CAFA, however, does not impose obligations or duties on the Federal
or State officials or require them to take action.152 Nor does CAFA expand
the authority of the notified public officials.153 Section 1715 was “designed
to ensure that a responsible state and/or federal official receives information
about proposed class action settlements and is in a position to react if the
settlement appears unfair to some or all class members or inconsistent with
applicable regulatory policies.”154 In effect, CAFA ensures there is an op-
portunity for independent oversight over coupon settlement.155
III. THE COURT’S APPLICATION OF CAFA
Since CAFA’s enactment, several questions have arisen concerning its
application. First, CAFA never defines “coupon settlements,” creating un-
certainty regarding the scope of § 1712.156 Second, courts do not agree on
the level of scrutiny required to approve coupon settlements under
§ 1712(e).157
A. CAFA’s Definition of Coupon Settlements
Coupon settlements traditionally consist of promotional coupons,
vouchers, or discount contracts.158 But, settlements that provide class mem-
bers free products or other in-kind relief even without a voucher may be
considered a coupon settlement.159 Problematically, CAFA does not define
coupon settlements,160 and courts disagree whether CAFA applies to only
discounts or a broader range of in-kind settlements.161 Nevertheless, courts
should adopt a broad interpretation of coupon settlements to ensure that
CAFA prevents the settlement abuses that it was intended to address.
150. Id. § 1715(d).
151. Id. § 1715(e)(1) (“A class member may refuse to comply with and may choose not to be
bound by a settlement agreement or a consent decree in a class action [if proper notice has not
been provided].”).
152. Id. § 1715(f).
153. Id.
154. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 32 (2005).
155. Id. at 34.
156. Kanner & Casey, supra note 9, at 305.
157. See Radosti v. Envision EMI, LLC, 717 F. Supp. 2d 37, 55 (D.D.C. 2010).
158. Leslie, A Market-Based Approach, supra note 21, at 994.
159. Id.
160. Radosti, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 54 n.16.
161. Gibson, supra note 104, at 1109.
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1. A Broad Definition of Coupon Settlements
Courts routinely apply CAFA to coupon settlements that include dis-
counts on a defendant’s products or services.162 For example, in Figueroa v.
Sharper Image Corp., the Southern District of Florida applied CAFA to a
proposed settlement that gave class members nineteen dollar coupons to
Sharper Image retail stores, an OzoneGuard to protect against ozone emis-
sion, injunctive remedies, and two million dollars in attorneys’ fees.163 Be-
cause the nineteen dollar coupons were vouchers redeemable for discounts
on future purchases from the defendant, the court found that CAFA applied.
Nevertheless, courts disagree whether CAFA also applies to settle-
ments that provide in-kind relief.164 In Synfuel Technologies, Inc. v. DHL
Express, Inc., although not applying CAFA,165 the Seventh Circuit dis-
cussed whether pre-paid shipping envelopes constituted a coupon settle-
ment under the Act.166 The court noted “pre-paid envelopes are not
identical to coupons, since they represent an entire product, not just a dis-
count on a proposed purchase.”167 But, the court continued to find that pre-
paid envelopes “are a form of in-kind compensation that shares some char-
acteristics of coupons, including forced future business with the defendant
and, especially for heavier users, the likelihood that the full amount of [the
defendant’s] gains will not be disgorged.”168 The court, however, did not
determine whether pre-paid products are a coupon settlement.169
CAFA’s legislative history, however, suggests that courts should inter-
pret coupon settlements broadly.170 The legislative history notes that cou-
pon settlements are settlements where class members receive coupons to
purchase products from defendants.171 But, it continues to provide a list of
162. In re HP Inkjet Printer Litig., No. 5:05-cv-3580, 2011 WL 1158635, at *5 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 29, 2011).
163. Figueroa v. Sharper Image Corp., 517 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 1295, 1320 (S.D. Fla. 2007).
164. See Gibson, supra note 104, at 1110.
165. CAFA does not apply retroactively; it only applies to cases commenced after February
18, 2005. Walker, supra note 4, at 850 n.6. This case was commenced in 2002. Synfuel Techs.,
Inc. v. DHL Express, Inc., 463 F.3d 646, 648 (7th Cir. 2006).
166. Synfuel Techs., Inc., 463 F.3d at 654.
167. Id.
168. Id. See also Yeagley v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. C 05-03403, 2008 WL 171083, at *8
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2008) (suggesting that coupon settlements provide class members a discount,
not the whole product, and force class members to do business with defendants).
169. Synfuel Techs., Inc., 463 F.3d at 648. Similarly, Yeagley v. Wells Fargo & Co. examined
a proposed settlement that provided class members with two free credit reports from any agency.
Yeagley, 2008 WL 171083, at *2. The court noted that the settlement was arguably a coupon
settlement. Id. at *8.
170. Fleury v. Richemont N. Am., Inc., No. C-05-4525 EMC, 2008 WL 3287154, at *2 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 6, 2008). (“The legislative history . . . suggests that even such a noncash benefit could
be a coupon.”).
171. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 16 (2005) (“These settlements include many so-called ‘coupon
settlements’ in which class members receive nothing more than promotional coupons to purchase
more products from the defendants.”).
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abuses in class action settlements that included settlements with vouchers
for discounts as well as in-kind relief, such as injunctions and free products,
demonstrating coupon settlements should be interpreted broadly.172
Furthermore, a broad definition of coupon settlements that includes
settlement for in-kind relief is consistent with the purposes of CAFA and is
good policy. CAFA states that “[c]lass members often receive little or no
benefit from class actions, and are sometimes harmed, such as where . . .
counsel are awarded large fees, while leaving class members with coupons
or other awards of little or no value.”173 The phrase “or other awards of
little or no value” suggests that CAFA’s provisions do not apply solely to
settlements with discounts. Rather, CAFA attempts to address abuses in a
broader range of in-kind settlements that do not adequately compensate
class members.
Lawyers can, moreover, abuse in-kind settlements just as they abused
coupon settlements. Like coupon settlements, in-kind settlements may not
provide valuable relief to class members, do not disgorge ill-gotten gains
from defendants, and require class members to do business with defend-
ants.174 By extending CAFA to apply to in-kind settlements that have simi-
lar effects as coupon settlements, the Act better protects consumers and
prevents settlement abuses. Furthermore, it prevents class counsel and de-
fendants from colluding to create in-kind settlements that act like a coupon
settlement but do not fall under CAFA. If courts interpret coupon settle-
ments strictly, CAFA will not be able to prevent many of the settlement
abuses that it was intended to prohibit.
2. A Restrictive Definition of Coupon Settlements
Several courts, however, apply CAFA strictly to settlements that in-
volve vouchers or discounts. These courts interpret Synfuel Technologies to
conclude a “noncash benefit cannot be a coupon if it allows a consumer to
buy an entire product.”175 The Seventh Circuit in Synfuel Technologies,
nonetheless, only compared in-kind relief with coupon settlements. It did
not hold whether such relief constituted a coupon settlement under
CAFA.176 Moreover, the court noted that in-kind relief had characteristics
of a coupon settlement.177 Therefore, Synfuel Technologies does not limit
the scope of CAFA.
172. See id. at 16–26; supra Part II.A; see also Fleury, 2008 WL 3287154, at *2 (describing
the legislative history of CAFA).
173. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(a)(3), 119 Stat. 4, 4 (2005).
174. In re HP Inkjet Printer Litig., No. 5:05-cv-3580, 2011 WL 1158635, at *6 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 29, 2011).
175. Fleury, 2008 WL 3287154, at *2. See also Radosti v. Envision EMI, LLC, 717 F. Supp.
2d 37, 54 n.16 (D.D.C. 2010).
176. See Synfuel Techs., Inc. v. DHL Express, Inc., 463 F.3d 646, 654 (7th Cir. 2006).
177. Id. at 654.
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In In re HP Inkjet Printer Litigation, the Northern District of Califor-
nia found coupon settlements “consist[ ] of a ‘discount on another product
or service offered by the defendant in the lawsuit.’”178 To support the pro-
position, the Northern District of California cites Fleury v. Richemont North
America, Inc.179 Fleury, however, does not limit the definition of coupon
settlements. Fleury stated “the legislative history suggests that a coupon is a
discount on another product or service offered by the defendant in the law-
suit.”180 But, Fleury continues to find, “the legislative history, however,
suggests that even such a noncash benefit could be a coupon.”181 Therefore,
Fleury suggests CAFA may extend to a broader set of in-kind settle-
ments.182 As a result, In re HP Inkjet Printer Litigation incorrectly relies on
Fleury to limit coupon settlements to discounts, undercutting the strength of
the decision.
Alternatively, even if a court strictly defines coupon settlements,
courts should apply CAFA’s principles to settlements that provide broader
in-kind relief.183 In Yeagley v. Wells Fargo & Co., the Northern District of
California did not determine whether the settlement was a coupon settle-
ment under CAFA.184 But, it found CAFA instructive when evaluating set-
tlements that resemble coupon settlements and examined the settlement
with greater scrutiny.185 Synfuel Technologies likewise stated that “even if
CAFA was not theoretically applicable, the ‘in-kind compensation’ compo-
nent was subject to higher scrutiny by the trial court,” the same scrutiny
required for coupon settlements under CAFA.186 Furthermore, In re HP
Inkjet Printer Litigation held “even if [the settlement] could be distin-
guished from coupons under CAFA, the statutory provisions are instructive
when the benefit to the class is coupon-like.”187 Therefore, courts that con-
clude CAFA does not apply to in-kind settlement should still evaluate the
settlement using CAFA’s principles.
B. Judicial Scrutiny Applied to Coupon Settlements Under § 1712(e)
CAFA does not state the level of scrutiny that courts should apply
when evaluating coupon settlements under § 1712(e). Many courts have in-
178. In re HP Inkjet Printer Litig., 2011 WL 1158635, at *5 (quoting Fleury, 2008 WL
3287154, at *2).
179. Id.
180. Fleury, 2008 WL 3287154, at *2 (emphasis added).
181. Id.
182. Fluery, however, again did not ultimately settle whether CAFA extends to such settle-
ments because the settlement in the case involved a discount. Id.
183. See Synfuel Techs., Inc. v. DHL Express, Inc., 463 F.3d 646, 654 (7th Cir. 2006); Yeag-
ley v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. C 05-03403, 2008 WL 171083, at *9 (Jan. 18, 2008).
184. Yeagley, 2008 WL 171083, at *9.
185. Id.
186. Synfuel Techs., Inc., 463 F.3d at 654.
187. In re HP Inkjet Printer Litig., No. 5:05-cv-3580JF, 2011 WL 1158635, at *6 (Mar. 29,
2011).
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terpreted § 1712(e) to require heightened scrutiny.188 Nevertheless, others
have rejected a heightened standard of scrutiny.189 Although courts have
applied two different levels of scrutiny under § 1712(e), both approaches
closely examine the bargaining process and the value of the coupon
settlement.
1. Heightened Scrutiny of Coupon Settlements
Although both § 1712(e) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)
require courts to find that a settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate,190
several courts apply a heightened standard of scrutiny when evaluating cou-
pon settlements under § 1712(e). Even though Synfuel Technologies did not
apply CAFA, the Seventh Circuit commented that CAFA requires height-
ened scrutiny of coupon-based settlements because coupon settlements
often provide class counsel large attorneys’ fees while class members re-
ceive little value.191 The court in Figueroa v. Sharper Image Corp. held that
CAFA requires heightened scrutiny of coupon settlements.192 Although the
standard in § 1712 is identical to Rule 23(e), the court applied heightened
scrutiny because Congress specifically required courts to find coupon settle-
ments were reasonable under § 1712(e).193 By requiring courts to approve
coupon settlements under § 1712(e), CAFA indicates that courts must give
explicit attention to coupon settlements and examine them more closely
than other class action settlements.194 Congress also expressed great con-
cern over coupon settlements, suggesting that courts should review coupon
settlements with heightened scrutiny.195 Furthermore, the majority of state
attorneys general disapprove of coupon settlements.196 As a result, the
Figueroa court held that “it is against this backdrop that the [court] under-
takes her review of the procedural and substantive fairness of the proposed
settlement.”197
The legislative history further supports that § 1712(e) subjects coupon
settlements to heightened scrutiny. The Senate Report states that CAFA
“implements a consumer bill of rights that requires greater scrutiny of both
coupon and net loss settlements.”198 Further, the legislative history states
that coupon settlements should be “seriously questioned” when the attor-
188. See, e.g., Synfuel Techs., Inc., 463 F.3d at 654.
189. See, e.g., Radosti v. Envision EMI, LLC, 717 F. Supp. 2d 37, 55 (D.D.C. 2010).
190. 28 U.S.C. 1712(e) (2006); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e).
191. Synfuel Techs., Inc., 463 F.3d at 654.
192. Figueroa v. Sharper Image Corp., 517 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 1321 (S.D. Fla. 2007).
193. Id.
194. See id.
195. Id. at 1320–21.
196. Id. at 1321.
197. Id.
198. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 27 (2005) (emphasis added).
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neys’ fees are disproportionate to the class recovery.199 By using the
phrases “greater scrutiny” and “seriously questioned,” the legislative history
indicates that heightened scrutiny is required under § 1712.
2. Section 1712(e) and Rule 23(e) Incorporate the Same Standard
Conversely, other courts held that coupon settlements should be evalu-
ated like other class action settlements under Rule 23(e). The Central Dis-
trict of California refused to adopt a heightened scrutiny standard under
§ 1712(e).200 Despite acknowledging that coupon settlements are generally
disfavored, the True court noted that the criticism “does not mean that a
coupon settlement can never be approved as fair, adequate, and reasona-
ble.”201 Rather, when evaluating a proposed coupon settlement, True found
courts “must discern if the value of a specific coupon settlement is reasona-
ble in relation to the value of the claims surrendered.”202
Furthermore, the court in Radosti v. Envision EMI, LLC found that
“the judicial scrutiny called for by § 1712(e) is indistinct from the scrutiny
required by Rule 23(e), with the understanding that coupon settlements pose
a particular risk of unfairness and unreasonableness.”203 Even though the
Radosti court held that § 1712(e) does not affect the level of scrutiny used
to evaluate settlements, it recognized the potential dangers of coupon settle-
ments.204 As a result, the court found that judges must be cognizant of the
abuses of coupon settlements while evaluating settlements under
§ 1712(e).205 Therefore, although there is no heightened standard of scru-
tiny, courts must be critical of coupon settlements to ensure they are not
abusive.206
3. Comparing the Two Approaches
Although the courts appear to apply two different standards to evaluate
coupon settlements, the approaches in fact are very similar. Figueroa and
Synfuel Technologies employ heightened scrutiny of coupon settlements
while True and Radosti evaluate coupon settlements under the Rule 23(e)
standard with an understanding that coupon settlements are often abused.
Both standards are critical of coupon settlements. Furthermore, in applying
§ 1712, Figueroa and True rejected the proposed coupon settlements207
199. Id. at 32 (emphasis added).
200. True v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 749 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1069 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1070.
203. Radosti v. Envision EMI, LLC, 717 F. Supp. 2d 37, 55 (D.D.C. 2010).
204. Id. at 55–56; see also True, 749 F. Supp. 2d at 1069 (describing common critiques of
coupon settlements).
205. See Radosti, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 56.
206. See id.
207. See True, 749 F. Supp. 2d at 1083; Figueroa v. Sharper Image Corp., 517 F. Supp. 2d
1292, 1329 (S.D. Fla. 2007).
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while Radosti approved the proposed coupon settlement.208 Although the
courts came to different conclusions in Figueroa and Radosti, they applied
similar reasoning.
a. The Figueroa Settlement
In Figueroa, the Southern District of Florida rejected what it called a
“near-perfect coupon settlement,”209 which provided class members a
nineteen dollar coupon at Sharper Image stores.210 The parties even retained
Professor Christopher Leslie to help structure the settlement; and, under
Professor Leslie’s suggestions, they eliminated restrictions on transferabil-
ity, product selection, expiration dates, and aggregation as well as simpli-
fied the redemption process.211
Nevertheless, the court found the settlement was not the result of
“arms-length negotiations” between class counsel and defendants.212 Al-
though there was no evidence of collusion, the court scrutinized the negoti-
ating process in detail and found that defendants dominated the negotiations
because class counsel had little bargaining power.213 In fact, Professor Les-
lie’s involvement in the settlement came as a result of the suggestion of
class members that objected to the settlement.214 Additionally, the court
found that the settlement did not confer sufficient value to class members
because class members had a strong probability of succeeding at trial and
felt that the nineteen dollar discount was not fair.215
Figueroa demonstrates that under heightened scrutiny, the court will
meticulously inspect both the bargaining process and the value of the pro-
posed settlement. If the court will not approve a “near-perfect” coupon set-
tlement designed by Professor Leslie, it is hard to imagine a coupon
settlement that will pass their standard of heightened scrutiny.
b. The Radosti Settlement
In contrast, the Radosti court approved a coupon settlement that pro-
vided class members two $625 coupons for tuition at the defendant’s educa-
tional conferences.216 Like Figueroa, the court closely examined the
bargaining process. Unlike the court in Figueroa, the Radosti court found
that the settlement was “the product of [an] arm’s-length negotiation” pro-
208. Radosti, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 65.
209. Figueroa, 517 F. Supp. 2d at 1321.
210. Id. at 1295.
211. Id. at 1323.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 1313. Figueroa did not make such a presumption, distinguishing the two
approaches.
215. Figueroa v. Sharper Image Corp., 517 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 1326–27 (S.D. Fla. 2007).
216. Radosti v. Envision EMI, LLC, 717 F. Supp. 2d 37, 46 (D.D.C. 2010).
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cess because the parties went through a lengthy mediation process and ex-
tensive discovery.217 Additionally, the court stated that there is a
presumption of fairness once the court determines there was a fair bargain-
ing process.218
Despite the presumption of fairness, the court analyzed the settle-
ment’s value in detail.219 The court found that the terms and restrictions in
the settlement “provided substantially more value” than the terms in the
Figueroa settlement.220 The vouchers were valid for seven years, were fully
transferable, could be aggregated, and had clear redemption instructions.221
Furthermore, if less than $8 million worth of vouchers were redeemed, the
settlement called for a cy pres fund to distribute up to $8 million in vouch-
ers.222 The parties agreed that Envision must offer at least $8 million in
coupons because Envision received $8 million in profits from the educa-
tional conferences in question.223 As a result, the settlement would disgorge
the defendant’s ill-gotten gains. Additionally, ninety-five percent of the par-
ticipants in the conferences in question had attended prior educational con-
ferences at Envision,224 suggesting that class members had a continued
interest in attending the conferences and would actually redeem the cou-
pons.225 For these reasons, the court found that the $625 coupons provided
more value to class members than the settlement in Figueroa.226 Therefore,
the settlement in Radosti addressed the two criticisms of the settlement in
Figueroa; the settlement was the result of an arms-length bargaining pro-
cess and provided more value to class members.227 As a result, the court
approved the settlement.228
Although Radosti applied a different standard than Figueroa to evalu-
ate settlements, the two approaches are very similar. Both courts closely
examined the bargaining process and the value of the settlements.229 It ap-
pears that the real difference between the two approaches is that, under
Radosti’s standard of scrutiny, courts may be more willing to approve a
coupon settlement than under the Figueroa court’s approach. This is evi-
dent from the lower standard of scrutiny Radosti applies and the presump-
217. Id. at 57.
218. Id.
219. See id. at 56–64.
220. Id. at 62–63.
221. Id. at 46–47.
222. Radosti v. Envision EMI, LLC, 717 F. Supp. 2d 37, 47 (D.D.C. 2010).
223. Id. at 58.
224. Id. at 57–58.
225. Id. at 58.
226. Id. at 62.
227. Id. at 62–63.
228. Radosti v. Envision EMI, LLC, 717 F. Supp. 2d 37, 47 (D.D.C. 2010).
229. When approving the settlement, the Radosti court explicitly addressed the critiques of the
Figueroa settlement. As a result, even the Figueroa court may have approved the Radosti
settlement.
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tion of fairness the court gave the settlement after determining the
negotiations were fair. Nevertheless, both approaches critically review cou-
pon settlements in detail.
IV. COUPON SETTLEMENTS AFTER CAFA
Even though CAFA regulated coupon settlements, many scholars ar-
gued that it would not prevent coupon settlement abuses. Despite criticism,
CAFA has effectively restricted the abuses of coupon settlements. As a re-
sult, coupon settlements can provide real value to customers, and parties
should not be discouraged from using them when appropriate.
A. CAFA’s Benefits
Despite some criticism, CAFA addresses many problems of coupon
settlements by increasing judicial scrutiny of coupon settlements,230 encour-
aging public officials to participate in coupon settlement approval hear-
ings,231 and aligning class counsel’s interest with their client’s interest.232
First, CAFA effectively regulates coupon settlements because it has
increased judicial awareness of the problems associated with coupon settle-
ments. Although critics argue that the standard in § 1712(e) already existed
under Rule 23(e), as discussed in Figueroa and Synfuel Technologies, sev-
eral courts interpret § 1712(e) to require heightened scrutiny of coupon set-
tlements.233 Even courts that reject heightened scrutiny are critical of
coupon settlements and evaluate them in light of their potential abuses.234
Therefore, § 1712(e) has caused courts to examine coupon settlements more
critically.
Second, CAFA also encourages public officials to intervene and pro-
tect class members from unfair settlements.235 CAFA requires defendants to
provide notice to appropriate public officials, so they can protect class
members from inequitable settlements.236 After the enactment of CAFA,
public officials have actually participated in, and objected to, potentially
abusive coupon settlements.237 The participation of public officials in the
approval of coupon settlements suggests that the provision is effective and
provides extra protection to class members.
230. See 28 U.S.C. § 1712(e) (2006).
231. Id. §1715 (2005).
232. Puiszis, supra note 10, at 175.
233. Synfuel Techs., Inc. v. DHL Express, Inc., 463 F.3d 646, 654 (7th Cir. 2006); Figueroa v.
Sharper Image Corp., 517 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 1320–21 (S.D. Fla. 2007).
234. Radosti v. Envision EMI, LLC, 717 F. Supp. 2d 37, 55 (D.D.C. 2010); True v. Am.
Honda Motor Co., 749 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1069 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
235. See 28 U.S.C. § 1715(b); S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 28 (2005).
236. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 28.
237. See Radosti, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 51; True, 749 F. Supp. 2d at 1058.
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Third, by encouraging defendants to create settlements that provide
actual value to class members, CAFA aligns class counsel and class mem-
bers’ interests.238 Under CAFA, class counsel will receive larger attorneys’
fees if class members receive more value from coupon settlements.239
Therefore, CAFA provides attorneys a large incentive to increase redemp-
tion rates and decrease burdensome restrictions on coupon settlements that
negate value.240
Furthermore, although critics argue that class counsel can get around
CAFA’s restrictions by calculating attorneys’ fees using the lodestar
method or by using in-kind settlements, these fears are exaggerated. Under
the lodestar method, courts must still approve attorneys’ fees,241 diminish-
ing the risk that class counsel may delay negotiations to receive larger attor-
neys’ fees.242 Courts disapprove of the lodestar method when it provides
large attorneys’ fees that are disproportionate to the class benefit.243 Courts
also have the power to require attorneys to base their fees on the value of
the coupons even if they elected to use the lodestar method.244
Finally, criticism that parties can avoid CAFA’s provisions by struc-
turing in-kind settlements is not persuasive.245 Even if parties structure cou-
pon-like, in-kind settlements that are not covered by CAFA,246 courts find
CAFA instructive when evaluating the settlement.247 Therefore, class mem-
bers will still be protected if the settlement is arguably outside of CAFA’s
provisions.
B. CAFA’s Deterrent Effect on Coupon Settlements
Although CAFA effectively responds to the abuses of coupon settle-
ments, it may go too far to discourage coupon settlements when they could
provide actual value to class members.248 CAFA creates large disincentives
and obstacles that prevent attorneys from using coupon settlements.249
CAFA reduces attorneys’ fees in coupon settlements by linking attorneys’
fees to the amount of coupons redeemed.250 CAFA, additionally, makes
238. Tharin & Blockovich, supra note 5, at 1445.
239. Id. at 1449.
240. Puiszis, supra note 10, at 175.
241. 28 U.S.C. § 1712(b)(2) (2006).
242. Casper, supra note 106, at 28.
243. See True v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 749 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1077–78 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
244. Id. (stating courts have the “discretion to use either a percentage or lodestar method in
awarding fees”).
245. Day, supra note 26, at 1114.
246. Id.
247. Synfuel Techs., Inc. v. DHL Express, Inc., 463 F.3d 646, 654 (7th Cir. 2006).
248. See Walker, supra note 4, at 859 (“In short, Congress has strongly discouraged coupon
settlements, if not actually prohibited them.”).
249. Gibson, supra note 104, at 1119; Tharin & Blockovich, supra note 5, at 1450; Koch,
supra note 48, at 48.
250. Gibson, supra note 104, at 1119.
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coupon settlements riskier for class counsel because the redemption rate
will always be uncertain, making coupon settlements economically unat-
tractive to them.251 Furthermore, since courts base attorneys’ fees on the
value of the coupons that are redeemed, class counsel must wait until the
coupons are used to receive their award.252 Depending on the settlement,
this could be months or even years.253 These factors make coupon settle-
ments unattractive to class counsel. As a result, CAFA will likely serve to
reduce the number of coupon settlements.254
C. The Need for Coupon Settlements
Despite CAFA’s discouragement of coupon settlements, parties should
not dismiss them as a viable way to settle class action claims. Even though
coupon settlements were traditionally abused, they can be an effective set-
tlement tool. When a defendant is facing bankruptcy, coupons may be nec-
essary to settle the case and ensure that class members receive some
benefit.255 Additionally, coupon settlements are an effective means to settle
marginal or weak class action claims. Coupon settlements help defendants
settle claims efficiently and inexpensively while still providing class mem-
bers some relief.256 Furthermore, since coupon settlements are less burden-
some on defendants, defendants may provide coupons with discounts that
are larger than the cash value of their claim.257 In such circumstances, “a
coupon would actually be more helpful to individual class members than
[the] mere pennies in damages” class members would receive in cash settle-
ments.258 Therefore, when these situations apply, coupon settlements pro-
vide real value to class members and may be more beneficial than a
traditional cash settlement.
D. Effective Coupon Settlements
One example of an effective coupon settlement would be a class action
against a company regarding “a potentially harmful product that has not yet
generated any actual damage.”259 After the company fixes the product de-
fect, class counsel and the company could create a coupon settlement that
provides class members a discount on the replacement product.260 Here,
class members own the defective product and need to replace it. Therefore,
251. See id. at 1119–20.
252. Id. at 1116.
253. See id. at 1120.
254. Id. at 1119.
255. Sherman, supra note 97, at 1614; Mezzetti & Case, supra note 68, at 1433–34; Day,
supra note 26, at 1099.
256. See Tharin & Blockovich, supra note 5, at 1444–45.
257. See Miller & Singer, supra note 4, at 114–15.
258. Day, supra note 26, at 1122.
259. Id. at 1126.
260. Id.
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the coupon is very valuable.261 Additionally, the company could structure
the coupon to give class members a larger discount than they would receive
in cash value, providing class members more value than a cash settlement.
“By forcing the defendant to fix the problem, and by allowing the plaintiffs
to get what they wanted in the first place, everyone is better off.”262
The Radosti settlement is another example of an effective coupon set-
tlement. As noted above, the settlement provided class members two vouch-
ers for $625 that could be used for tuition to attend the educational
conferences, which provided real value to class members.263 The coupons
represented an eighteen to forty-one percent discount on the tuition for En-
vision’s programs.264 Additionally, the court found that class members had
a continuing interest in attending Envision’s conferences, suggesting high
redemption rates.265 Moreover, the coupons did not have burdensome re-
strictions that negate their value.266
Furthermore, Envision was in financial trouble at the time of the settle-
ment and may have filed bankruptcy if required to pay a cash settlement.267
Class counsel recognized that if Envision filed bankruptcy, class members
would potentially receive no relief.268 Therefore, the settlement ensured that
class members received some value.
Therefore, the Radosti coupon settlement addressed many of the
problems that have plagued coupon settlements prior to CAFA. It provided
real value to class members, encouraged high redemption rates, eliminated
burdensome restrictions, and deterred defendants by disgorging their prof-
its. There was also no collusion between class counsel and defendants. Fi-
nally, there was a need to use coupons instead of a cash settlement. All
these factors demonstrate that the settlement was fair, and courts should
look to them when evaluating coupon settlements under § 1712(e).
Based on these examples, coupon settlements can provide real value to
class members. As a result, coupon settlements should not be abandoned
after CAFA. Rather, parties should work to create a settlement that ad-
dresses the past abuses of coupon settlements to benefit class members.
CONCLUSION
Because coupon settlements were abused and manipulated to create
settlements that provided little value to class members, coupon settlements
have been widely criticized. This criticism sparked Congress to pass the
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Radosti v. Envision EMI, LLC, 717 F. Supp. 2d 37, 62 (D.D.C. 2010).
264. Id. at 57.
265. Id. at 57–58.
266. See id. at 46–47.
267. Id. at 60.
268. Id.
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Consumer Class Action Bill of Rights in CAFA, which regulated and
largely discouraged coupon settlements. Although this Comment has shown
that CAFA has effectively addressed the abuses of coupon settlements, the
Act may go too far to deter the use of coupon settlements where they can be
an effective settlement tool.
Coupon settlements can provide real benefits to class members if
structured correctly. Coupon settlements are especially appropriate in cases
where defendants face bankruptcy, class members’ claims are weak, or the
claims are for minimal damages. Therefore, coupon settlements should not
be summarily dismissed as a way to settle a claim. With the changes
brought by CAFA and increased judicial scrutiny, parties should be open to
exploring coupon settlements as an effective means to resolve class claims.
